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WEST VERSUS EAST: EARLY GLOBALIZATION AND THE GREAT 
DIVERGENCE 
 
Abstract: 
This paper extends our previous work on grain market integration across Europe and the Americas in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Dobado, García-Hiernaux and Guerrero, 2012). By using the same 
econometric methodology, we now present: 1) a search for statistical evidence in the East of an “Early 
Globalization” comparable to the one ongoing in the West by mid eighteenth century; 2) a study on the 
integration of grain markets in China and Japan and its functioning in comparison to Western countries; 3) a 
discussion of the relevance of our findings for the debate on the Great Divergence.  Our main conclusions are: 1) 
substantial differences in the degree of integration and the functioning of grain markets are observed between 
East and West; 2) a certain degree of integration may be reached through different combinations of factors 
(agents, policies, etc.) and with dissimilar effects on long-run economic growth; 3) the absence of an “Early 
Globalization” in the East reveals the existence of some economic and institutional limitations in this part of the 
world and contributed to its “Great Divergence” with the West from at least the eighteenth century. 
 
Keywords: Economic history, Market integration, Globalization, Great divergence, Time series 
analysis 
 
 
OESTE FRENTE A ESTE: GLOBALIZACIÓN TEMPRANA Y GRAN 
DIVERGENCIA 
 
Resumen: 
 Este trabajo expande nuestra investigación previa sobre la integración del mercado de granos en Europa y 
América (Dobado, García-Hiernaux y Guerrero, 2012). Usando la misma metodología econométrica, 
presentamos ahora: 1) la búsqueda de evidencia estadística en el Este de una “Globalización temprana” 
semejante a la encontrada en el Oeste desde mediados del siglo XVIII; 2) un estudio de la integración de los 
mercados en china y Japón y su funcionamiento en comparación con los países occidentales; 3) una discusión de 
la relevancia de nuestros resultados respecto al debate sobre la “Gran Divergencia”. Nuestras principales 
conclusiones son: 1) encontramos diferencias sustanciales entre Este y Oeste en lo que al grado de integración y 
al funcionamiento de los mercados de grano se refiere; 2) un cierto grado de integración puede ser alcanzado 
mediante combinaciones diferentes de factores (agentes, políticas, etc.) y con efectos distintos sobre el 
crecimiento económico a largo plazo; 3) la ausencia de una “Globalización temprana” en el Este revela la 
existencia de limitaciones económicas e institucionales en esta parte del mundo y contribuyó a la “Gran 
Divergencia” con el Oeste desde al menos el siglo XVIII. 
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This paper presents a preliminary attempt at contributing to two important 
brands of economic literature: 1) Globalization (i.e., international market integration); 
and 2) “Great Divergence” between East and West. It does so by means of a twofold 
research strategy that combines theoretically-based (Law of One Price) econometric 
work with empirically well-founded, albeit somewhat speculative, traditional economic 
history.  
It is our contention that the absence in the East of the intra- and intercontinental 
grain market integration found by Dobado et al. (2012) in the West as early as by mid 
eighteenth century may be interpreted as a form of Western exceptionalism. We identify 
several significant dissimilarities between West and East concerning grain market 
integration: geo-economic scope (intra- and intercontinental versus national); evolution 
over time (secular progress versus reversal in the nineteenth century); role of agents 
(market forces versus state and others as leading forces) and policies (relative openness 
to foreign trade versus relative closeness). Therefore, West and East were different in 
this important respect both before and after the Industrial Revolution. 
The restrictive trade policy practiced by the East (China, Japan and Korea) 
might have been one of the biggest economic policy mistakes ever committed since it 
prevented that part of the world from taking advantage of the direct (static and dynamic 
gains) and indirect (institutional) benefits resulting from the expansion of foreign trade 
during the Early Modern Era. 
However, in spite of its importance, the absence of international grain market 
integration has not yet considered in the debate on the “Great Divergence”. Basically 
based on the pursuit of internal policy goals, the closing of the Eastern economies 
during the Early Modern Era has been one of the biggest mistakes of economic policy 
ever made since it contributed to the “Great Divergence” well before 1800.  
Aside from this introduction, the paper comprises: 1) a first section in which the 
historical processes of Globalization and Great Divergence are discussed; 2) a second 
section that presents the econometric methodology and the main results of our empirical 
work; and 3) a summary of our chief conclusions in the third section. 
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1. Globalization and Great Divergence 
 
When did globalization start? The answer to this question depends on how 
globalization is defined. De Vries (2010) distinguishes between “soft” and “hard” 
globalization. Flynn and Giráldez claim that “soft globalization” started “when the Old 
World became directly connected with the Americas in 1571 via Manila.” 1  “Hard 
globalization” is defined by O’Rourke and Williamson as “integration of markets 
across space”.2 For well-founded theoretical and empirical reasons, this definition is 
more popular among economists. Therefore, it is the one adopted here. Then, 
globalization started in the West by the first half of the eighteenth century when grain 
markets became increasingly integrated within Europe and between Europe and the US 
-see Dobado, García-Hiernaux and Guerrero (2012).3
Our econometric methodology, supplemented with substantial historical 
evidence, permits us to offer a new perspective on the globalization process that 
somewhat differs from one established in their pioneering works by O’Rourke and 
Williamson (1999, 2002a, 2002b and 2004) –see Figure 1 and Figure 2. Thus, starting 
in the first half of the eighteenth century, globalization predated rather than followed the 
first instance of modern economic growth, the Industrial Revolution. This important 
finding might have been previously overlooked because intercontinental market 
integration was interrupted by the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-
1815) and their aftermath.
 
4
The dramatic expansion of foreign trade across the West in the Early Modern 
Era delivered significant economic benefits. The direct impact of foreign trade (e.g. via 
 When globalization regained momentum, it then coincided 
with –and was favoured by- the spread of the Industrial Revolution throughout Europe 
and the US. We term the pre-1792 intra- and intercontinental integration of grain 
markets as “Early Globalization”. Latin American countries, with the possible partial 
exception of Chile due to its trade on wheat with Peru, did not join the “Early 
Globalization”.    
                                                        
1 Flynn and Giráldez, 2004, p. 82. 
2 O’Rourke and Williamson, 2004, p. 109. 
3  Throughout this paper, despite its vagueness, the term “West” refers to the US and Europe, not 
including the Ottoman Empire. “East” is also a vague concept. Hereinafter, “East” means China and 
Japan. On top of deep historical reasons, that meaning is consistent with the content of this paper. India 
has been consciously left outside that “East”.    
4 O’Rourke (2006) has shown the disruptive effects of this cycle of wars on the Atlantic economy but 
might have underestimated the level of market integration effectively reached in the West prior to the 
early 1790s. 
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specialization, expansion of internal markets, etc.) on economic growth has been 
recognized since long time ago by economists. In this respect, despite all due 
qualifications, the contrast between a relatively “open” West and a relatively “closed” 
East (e.g., haijin and cohong in, respectively, Ming and Qing China and sakoku and 
kaikin in Tokugawa Japan) is apparent.5 Adam Smith wrote that the “Chinese have little 
respect for foreign trade”.6
The West relative openness resulted into a dynamic Atlantic trade -the Baltic 
and the Mediterranean being interconnected to it- on which the Early Globalization was 
based. Additionally, the Atlantic trade significantly contributed through an indirect 
institutional channel to the “First Great Divergence”: the unprecedented economic 
growth that Europe experienced between 1500 and 1800 (Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2005).
 The seclusion policy set in place by the edicts of the 1630’s 
is one of the main characteristics of Tokugawa Japan.  
7 According to these authors, large profits generated by the Atlantic 
trade, especially in Britain and the Netherlands, increased the political bargaining power 
of the commercial interests which induced significant institutional change of the type 
(i.e. secure property rights) that favoured economic growth in pre-industrial Europe. 
Moreover, Morris (2010) suggests that the challenge represented by the “Atlantic 
frontier” acted as a powerful incentive for the West to find scientifically-based answers 
to practical problems. By doing so, it promoted divergence from the East in long-term 
social –and economic- development since the early 1770’s “or thereabouts”. On the 
contrary, the “steppe frontier” proved much less stimulating for China. In spite of its 
importance, the growing overland trade with Russia in the eighteenth century –that 
somewhat substituted for the declining Silk Road- was even smaller than the limited 
maritime commerce that took place at Canton under the cohong system with the early-
globalized Western countries.8                                                        
5 In spite of Western mercantilism, trade policies in China or Japan were incomparably more restrictive, 
including from phases of autarchy or very limited contact with foreigners to the total evacuation of some 
coastal areas of South-eastern China -see Findlay and O’Rourke (2007).  
 
6 Taken from Millar, 2011, p. 205. This author finds in European sources “a consistent narrative of 
frustration” originated by the meeting between “European ambitions of achieving a bountiful of trading 
relationship with China, met with the reality of Chinese restrictions.” Ibidem, pp. 206-207. 
7 “Atlantic trade”, in these authors’ opinion, “means trade with the New World, as well as trade with Asia 
via the Atlantic, and includes colonialism- and slavery-related activities” (Acemoglu et al., 2005, p. 546). 
However, the growing integration across the “early globalizing West” (i.e., an imprecise, changing, and 
porous space stretching from Pennsylvania to the Danzig-Vienna-Milan arch –see Dobado et al. (2012)-) 
could not but to reinforce the institutional effect of the “Atlantic trade” à la Acemoglu et al. (2005). 
Actually, trade within Western Europe alone was bigger than with the rest of the world circa 1790 
(O’Rourke, Prados and Daudin, 2008). 
8 See Findlay and O’Rourke, 20007, pp. 284-300. 
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That the increase in foreign trade contributed to economic growth in Meiji Japan 
is widely accepted by economists and economic historians. According to Bernhofen and 
Brown (2005), the static gains to Japan resulting from the opening-up of its economy 
were close to ten per cent of the GDP. Recently, Keller, Li and Shiue (2012) have 
shown the importance of the opening of China to foreign trade through Shanghai after 
the Opium War for the long-run growth performance of the country. 
The idea that the East had fallen behind the West economically before the 
Industrial Revolution is long lasting and influential.9 Nonetheless, since the late 1990s it 
has been challenged by a stimulating revisionist view on the comparative levels of 
economic development at the two ends of Eurasia.10 As a consequence of its criticism to 
aspects of previous explanations of the rise of Europe, further quantitative research has 
been conducted. It has yielded interesting results. Some of them are relevant to the aim 
of this paper. The beginning of the “Early Globalization” seems to have occurred at a 
point in time when indications of the Great Divergence between West -or at least its 
most advanced parts- and East can be found. In the eighteenth century, living standards 
in London and Amsterdam were higher than in Chinese (Suzhou, Beijing and Canton) 
or Japanese (Kyoto/Tokyo) towns (Allen, Bassino, Ma, Moll-Murata and Van Zanden, 
2011). These authors conclude that the comparisons of living standards “paint a less 
optimistic picture of Asian performance than the revisionists suggest.” 11  This 
conclusion is consistent with the turning point observed “somewhere between 1750 and 
1800” in the respective regional values of the index of social development built by 
Morris (2010): for the first time since the sixth century, the East was surpassed by the 
West.12
Li and Van Zanden (2012) estimate that differences between two of the most 
advanced economies in Europe and China (the Netherlands and Hua-Lou, part of the 
Yangtze delta, respectively) were significant already in the 1820s. GDP per capita was 
almost ninety per cent higher in the Netherlands than in the Hua-Lou area. Moreover, 
these authors suggest that in 1820 –it is to say, before the spread of the Industrial 
Revolution across the Continent – relative GDP per capita between Western Europe and 
  
                                                        
9 See, among others, Weber (1905:1930), Jones (1981, Landes (1998, 2006) and Maddison (2007a, 
2007b). 
10 I.e., Wong (1997), Frank (1998), Pomeranz (2000) and Goldstone (2008). 
11 Allen et al., 2011, p. 9. 
12 Morris, 2012, p. 482. Morris’ index of social development accounts for four dimensions (energy 
capture, urbanization, war-making and information technology).  
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China might be not far from the one estimated by Maddison.13
However, the revisionist view on the comparative levels of development in East 
and West before the Industrial Revolution retains much of its intellectual appeal and 
influence. Besides, there still remain a lot of unanswered questions about the economic 
performance of these two parts of the world in the Early Modern Era. One of great 
interest among them is whether “Early globalization” in the West and “Great 
Divergence” between East and West are causally related. Our hypothesis is that they 
are. On the one hand, “Early Globalization” required a certain level of effective 
political, institutional, economic and technological development applied to the 
functioning of grain markets across national borders. On the other hand, since well-
functioning markets are necessary for economic growth, “Early Globalization” –
similarly to the subsequent phases of the process in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, albeit less intensely- therefore favoured divergence between those countries 
or regions that took part in it and those that did not. Thus, “Early Globalization” was 
made possible by pre-existing differences between West and East (i.e. better institutions 
and policies to promote foreign trade intensification) and contributed to widen the initial 
gap in GDP per capita between East and West through the direct and indirect economic 
benefits delivered to the latter, but not, or very much less so, to the former by 
international commerce. 
 As to Japan, Bassino et 
al. (2011) find that the GDP per capita was less than half that of Great Britain by 1700 
while in 1800 it had lowered to thirty per cent despite its relatively fast growth since 
1850. 
In our view, “Early Globalization” is a particular form of Western 
exceptionalism. This exceptionality consisted of economic policies that supported well-
functioning national and international markets and therefore fostered. However, the 
very idea of any Western exceptionalism conflicts with the basic conclusions by the 
revisionist school. In particular, regarding grain market performance and, more 
generally, markets allocative efficiency, Shiue and Keller (2007) convincingly claim 
that “as to the period right before the Industrial Revolution took place in Western 
Europe, grain markets did not perform uniformly better in Western Europe than in 
                                                        
13  The ongoing revision of the economic growth before 1820 by the Maddison Project takes into 
consideration new quantitative research on the GDP per capita levels in Eurasia and basically confirms 
the pre-revisionist view of Angus Maddison on the gap between East and West –see Bolt and Van 
Zanden, 2013. 
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China.”14 Bassino (2007) also concludes that markets in Japan between 1717 and 1857 
“were fairly well integrated”. 15
The main novelties in this paper with respect to others dealing with market 
integration in the East are firstly of methodological order. Our econometric approach 
provides a metrics that can be used to estimate and compare the integration between 
markets in a given year as well as over a short, medium or long period. Besides, we take 
into account not only domestic market integration but also, and especially, international 
(intra-and intercontinental) market integration in both East and West. Developments 
occurred in the nineteenth-century are considered as well. Additionally, we pay 
attention to the differences in terms of agents of the integration: 1) the leading role of 
the “high Qing” state in the circulation of grain throughout the empire; 2) the basically 
feudal origin of most of the rice traded by the brokers that operated in the sophisticated 
Dojima market of Osaka. Differences in the historical context in which integration was 
reached (e.g., agents, market power and trade policies) matters since they had varied 
consequences for modern economic growth in the East and the West.  
 Thus, as in other domains, any Western superiority 
needs to be empirically demonstrated rather than a priori assumed. We try to do that by 
studying market integration in some selected grain markets in China and Japan.  
Our study confirms the accuracy of the findings by Shiue and Keller (2007) and 
Bassino (2007). Besides, it complements them by showing some of the limitations of 
the grain market integration reached in the East: mainly, its national, not international, 
geo-economic scope and its stagnation or reversal in the nineteenth century. We infer 
that these limitations are relevant regarding the explanation of why the Great 
Divergence between East and West took place before the Industrial Revolution.  
 
 
2. Econometric methodology and empirical results 
 
In this section, we present the sample of grain (wheat and rice) price series used 
and the methodology, models and results of our statistical analysis.  
We consider markets for wheat in the West: three not yet considered in England 
(Eton, Exeter and Winchester) and those (Amsterdam and Holland, Arévalo, Gdansk, 
London and Southern England, Milan, Pennsylvania, Strasbourg and Vienna)                                                         
14 Shiue and Keller, 2007, p. 1205.  
15 Bassino, 2007, p. 19. 
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previously analyzed in depth in Dobado et al. (2012). On the other side, we also include 
in the sample eleven markets for rice in the East: eight in Japan (Osaka, Fukuchiyama, 
Bocho, Kumamoto, Nagoya, Aizu, Rural Banshu, Hiroshima, Saga Edo, Shinshu and 
Dewa) and three in China (Yangtze river delta, Jiangsu and Hunan). The selection of 
markets responds to a mixed criterion: data availability and geographical 
representativeness. The markets in England, Japan and China will be mainly used with 
the purpose of a national integration comparison. The rest of the markets will be used 
for the purpose of inter- and intracontinental comparison. We work with long yearly 
data series covering most of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries for most 
markets. Data sources are shown in Appendix 1.16
As units of measure, we convert original prices into prices in terms of grams of 
silver per liter for both West and East.  
 
The steps of our methodology for analyzing the evolution of market integration are 
presented in Table 1. A detailed explanation can be found in Dobado et al. (2012). 
Broadly speaking, we check that (log) nominal prices are cointegrated and follow the 
Law of One Price (LOP), through nonstationarity tests applied to the logarithm of 
nominal and relative prices (log(Pit) and log(Pit / Pjt), respectively).17
Our analysis starts by studying the nonstationarity of all (log) nominal grain prices 
included in the sample. In a second step, we test the nonstationarity of (log) relative 
prices for every combination of wheat/rice nominal prices that were previously 
identified as I(1). By first confirming the I(1) property of nominal prices and then the 
stationarity of relative prices, the cointegrating relationship and cointegration parameter 
equal to -1 are jointly tested, which is conceptually preferable and statistically more 
 When nominal 
prices are cointegrated, we take advantage of the fact that the more integrated a market 
is the less effect unpredictable shocks have on relative prices between pairs of markets. 
Bearing that in mind, we study the evolution over time of the dispersion of the residuals 
obtained from fitting an ARMA model to relative prices. Obviously, if two nominal 
prices have different order of integration then the LOP does not hold and we conclude 
that they cannot be integrated from an economic point of view.  
                                                        
16 We acknowledge the generosity of those authors that made available their own and others’ data to the 
academic community through the web pages of the International Institute for Social History and the 
Global Price and Income History Group. Allen’s work deserves special recognition regarding our work. 
All authors to which we are grateful are mentioned in Appendix 1.  
17 Series of nominal or relative prices are logarithmically transformed to avoid heteroskedasticity related 
to increasing mean. We test the nonstationarity using Shin and Fuller (1998) statistic on a fitted ARMA 
model.    
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efficient. The cointegration relationship between two (log) nominal prices with 
cointegrating parameter equal to -1 is closely related to the LOP. If the log price 
differential is stationary, log(Pit) - log(Pjt) = ijt, where ijt is a zero-mean stationary 
process, then the log relative price is also stationary, log(Pit / Pjt) = ijt. The latter is the 
mathematical representation of the stochastic and dynamic notion of the LOP in strong 
form: in an efficient market, all identical goods have the same price in the long run. 
However, the empirical analysis will show that the relative prices analyzed suffer 
transitory fluctuations around a long run constant nonzero mean. This situation refers to 
a weaker version of the LOP that permits imperfect competition, trade barriers and 
transport costs. The effect of these transaction costs in relative prices is captured by the 
nonzero mean. From now on in the paper, the term LOP will always refer to this weaker 
form. We therefore agree with Persson (1999), Ejrnaes and Persson (2000) and Shiue 
and Keller (2007) that cointegration provides substantial evidence in favor of market 
integration.18
If the hypothesis that LOP holds cannot be rejected –and only in that case-, we 
then focus on the dispersion of the unpredictable shocks affecting the relative prices. In 
this third step of our empirical analysis, we interpret the residuals of the (log) relative 
price univariate models as the net idiosyncratic shocks of the nominal prices. Földváry 
and Van Leeuwen (2010) convincingly discuss the advantages of using the dispersion of 
these residuals instead of other commonly utilized statistical approaches –e.g., 
coefficients of variation- for measuring market efficiency. In this respect, the residual 
variance will reflect the share of unforeseeable shocks in total variance, i.e., the effect 
of unexpected events on relative price volatility. If markets are very integrated, 
unexpected events on the nominal prices should have a reduced effect on relative prices. 
Consequently, decreasing trend-like behavior in the Standard Deviation of the 
Innovations (SDI) of the relative prices between pairs of markets will be interpreted as 
an increasing market’s ability to cope with the effect of shocks on nominal prices and 
therefore as increasing integration between those pairs of markets 
 However, in our paper we are more demanding, as we also require the 
cointegration parameter to be equal to -1, i.e., we require the LOP to hold. This part of 
our analysis encompasses steps 1 and 2 in Table 1.  
Finally, the study of the residual dispersion obtained from the estimated (log) 
relative price models was carried out through the evolution over time of the SDI                                                         
18 However, the economic interpretation of cointegration is not self evident –see Federico (2008). We 
agree with him that cointegration is not a sufficient condition of market integration. 
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calculated with rolling windows of 35 observations for every relative price (e.g., 
Osaka/Edo, Pennsylvania/London, etc.).19
Our methodology is based on the ARMA representation of the price series.
 In any figure where the SDI is drawn (see, 
for instance Figure 1), each point at year t represents the standard deviation of that 
residual and the previous thirty-four residuals. 
20
We only use univariate analysis of log relative prices to study pairwise 
cointegration relationships between markets. This has a clear advantage with respect to 
VAR, VARMA or any other multivariate representation in terms of simplicity in the 
specification and interpretation. The empirical identification for log(Pit / Pjt), where Pit 
and Pjt represent two log nominal wheat (or rice) price series, reveals that most log 
relative prices are stationary, i.e., integrated of order zero. In these cases the 
cointegration with cointegrating parameter equal to -1 is confirmed (i.e., the West). A 
significant exception must be pointed to this result: the Chinese rice series are not 
cointegrated with the Japanese ones. 
 We 
find that all the log nominal prices, log(Pit), present a stochastic trend that can be 
removed by taking differences, i.e., they are integrated of order one. 
Our main empirical findings and their interpretation are enumerated below: 
1) The econometric analysis shows that the markets in England were highly 
integrated. The evolution of the SDI of the residuals obtained from the ARMA models 
of the log relative prices (which is our dynamic measure of integration) confirms this 
fact. Figure 3 shows that the integration reached levels of 4% and below before 1800. 
This is not surprising, as England probably was the most integrated –and certainly the 
most dynamic- economy of the world by that time. What could be more surprising is 
that Jiangsu and Yangtze Delta River, which are 185 miles far from each other -quite 
similar to the 170 miles distance between Eton and Exeter-, were nearly as integrated as 
the English ones by 1800 –see Figure 4. This result coincides with those presented by 
Shiue and Keller (2007) about the comparison between the integration level in some 
Chinese provinces and England around the end of the eighteenth Century. On the other 
hand, markets in Japan show a significant national integration level as well, which is                                                         
19 Different values for the size of the rolling window were tried. Obviously, the higher are the values, the 
smoother are the series. This does not change the trend of the standard deviations but the minimum and 
maximums are more difficult to identify. 
20 The specification is carried out using simple and partial autocorrelation functions, and AIC (Akaike, 
1974) and HQ (Hannan and Quinn, 1979) information criteria. The results of the parameter estimation 
and hypothesis tests are reported in Appendix 2, Table A.2. Additionally, we carried out an analysis with 
the same series in local currencies that is available from the authors upon request. The findings were very 
similar and the conclusions do not vary significantly. 
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consistent with Bassino (2007). As an example, the integration degree between Osaka 
and Hiroshima (within a distance range of less than 200 miles from each other and 
therefore comparable with the representative markets selected for China and England) 
stays consistently below 10% during the second half of the eighteenth century –see 
Figure 5. That level was certainly higher than those of Eton/Exeter and 
Jiangsu/Yangtze, but still indicates a significant degree of integration if compared with 
that between markets in different continents in the West –see Figures 1 and 2- estimated 
by Dobado et al. (2012); or, as could be expected, with respect to other, more distant 
pairs of domestic markets in Japan (as can be seen in Figure 5). Thus, national 
integration level was relatively similar (at least in short or medium distances) in 
England, China and Japan (being a little bit lower in the latter).  
Regarding integration between less proximate markets in China and Japan, we can 
see that distance was an important drawback: the integration degree between 
Yangtze/Hunan or Osaka/Aizu (about 675 and 400 miles away from each other, 
respectively) was considerably lower than in the above-mentioned cases of closer 
proximity (see Figures 4 and 5). Albeit distance –as well as geographical obstacles- 
always constitutes an impediment to market integration, it was probably much more so 
in Japan than in China or England because they were reinforced by intentional measures 
taken by the government such as the prohibition of constructing large tonnage vessels 
(Bassino, 2007), restrictions on wheeled traffic (Vaporis, 1994), etc.        
2) In this second point we deepen in how these three countries (England, China 
and Japan) reached substantially high national degrees of integration. We will briefly 
explain the main differences between the fundamentals of markets functioning that led 
to domestic markets integration. Behind the different levels and dynamics of grain 
market integration across East and West we find three institutional models: i) markets 
(domestic as well as foreign) had since relatively early in the eighteenth century a much 
more important role as allocative mechanisms in Europe and the US (“market-led 
integration”); ii) in China the state, through tribute in kind, ever normal granaries, stock 
accumulation, public works, relief policy, etc., was the leading force, especially during 
the “golden Qing” epoch, behind the systematic redistribution of grain between 
(basically from South to North) and within (mainly in Northern areas) regions and 
economic groups (from producers to consumers) in a rather than not closed  economy 
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(“state-controlled integration”); 21
Thus, significant levels of national grain markets integration were achieved in 
different ways and with diverse short and long term effects on the economic behaviour 
of grain consumers and producers and, hence, on the ability of the country’s economy to 
generate modern economic growth. The Chinese “state-controlled integration” seems to 
have been more efficient at limiting the consequences of bad harvests on the 
commoners. However, in the nineteenth century, it could barely survive to the loss of 
political and economic power by the state and did not favor the modernization of the 
Chinese institutional framework during the late Qing dynasty.
 iii) Tokugawa Japan presents a nearly autarchic 
economy in which rice originated as feudal payments by peasants to the samurai class 
reached a well-integrated and sophisticated market (in Osaka, the world first futures 
markets was regulated by the Shogunate as early as in 1730) (“feudal/Dojima 
integration”).  
22
3) In this third argument we relate the previous point and new findings with the 
Great Divergence. As we have shown above, one possible reason that could have 
contributed to the Great Divergence was the completely different institutional (agents 
and policies) mechanisms that drove the national integration in West and East. Now we 
present a second important finding that supports this fact and add another argument to 
explain the divergence between these two parts of the world. Coming back to England, 
our econometric results show that not only the domestic integration was high and 
increasing along the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but also the international 
(continental and intercontinental) integration improved quickly. Dobado et al. (2012) 
show that Europe and British North-America increased their intercontinental integration 
levels during the second half of the eighteenth century –see Figures 1 and 2. This 
 In Japan, a domestic 
rice market isolated from foreign competition and dominated by the landing class 
caused a high price level that in turn was at the bottom of social unrest and hurt the 
economy of Tokugawa Japan. The Western model was less sophisticated than the 
Japanese and, especially during the transition from medieval to modern regulation of 
grain markets, inferior to the Chinese at providing relief in case of famine. 
Notwithstanding, it proved to be more conductive for raising living standards in the 
long run and bringing about sustainable economic growth.  
                                                        
21 See among others Will (1990), Wong (1997), Shiue (2005) and Li (2000, 2007). 
22 In contrast with long-term fiscal developments in the Western countries, the Qing state collected the 
same amount of per capita tax revenue in terms of grams of silver in 1650-1699 as in 1850-1899 (Brandt 
et al. 2012). 
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process was interrupted by the French Revolutionary and the Napoleonic Wars and was 
kept in a standby position during the Corn Laws. However, the process resumed faster 
than before from the middle of the nineteenth century to the end of the Century. Figure 
1 and Figure 2 illustrate how the effect of distance and other transaction costs on 
integration decreased as a result of the canonical period of globalization. By 1900, the 
degree of market integration between Holland/London and Pennsylvania/London 
reached levels of roughly 7%.  
On the contrary, nothing similar occurred in the East. As a matter of fact, when we 
analyze the relation between rice Japanese and Chinese markets, the cointegration is 
clearly rejected.23
The disconnection between markets within the East was caused by the restrictive 
trade policies adopted by the Qing and Tokugawa states. These policies responded 
basically to political goals and contrast with those that were being adopted in the West 
and resulted in the “Early Globalization” that becomes, then, a form of Western 
exceptionalism in terms of market functioning and allocative efficiency. Important as it 
is, the absence of international integration of grain markets in the East during the 
eighteenth century has not yet played any part in the debate on the “Great Divergence”. 
 No statistical –neither historical for that matter- evidence is found of 
any similarity whatsoever in the long-run behavior of rice prices between these two 
countries, despite being separated by about 560 miles (from Yangtze to Kagoshima) 
across the East China Sea. This finding is quite surprising since an almost permanent 
positive differential in prices existed between Osaka and the Yangtze river delta. This 
differential was higher than the one existing between Western markets. It is then 
difficult to understand the economic rationale, if any, behind the absence of grain trade 
from China to Japan. Moreover, on top of the quasi-constant differential in prices that 
would explain systematic exports of rice from the Yangtze delta river to Osaka, 
occasional short-term changes in the relative price between the two markets were large 
enough as to make punctual arbitrage potentially very profitable. This substantial 
potential for trade within the East was far from being exploited during the Early Modern 
Era. On the contrary, the institutional framework of the Early Modern Era allowed for 
trade policies in the West that made possible to exploit narrower margins for 
commercial profits. 
                                                        
23 The results of the unit roots and cointegration analyses for all the (log) nominal and relative price series 
are documented in an appendix that can be downloaded from the web page 
www.ucm.es/info/ecocuan/agh/ 
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However, it prevented China and Japan from obtaining the direct and indirect economic 
benefits delivered to the West by the increase in foreign trade before the Industrial 
Revolution and contributed to the “Great Divergence”. Closing the economies of the 
East during the Early Modern Era was one of the main economic policy mistake ever 
made.  
 
 
3. Chief conclusions  
 
1) Despite the geographical proximity and easiness of transportation between China 
and Japan, no statistical evidence of grain market integration between the two countries 
is found. This finding is somewhat unexpected and contrasts with the increasing intra-
continental and inter-continental integration of grain markets observed in the West 
before 1792 (“Early Globalization”) and after the 1840s (canonical globalization). 
Historical evidence confirms that the two large Eastern markets for grain were 
disconnected: no significant trade in rice between China and Japan on permanent basis 
has been recorded. That neither Korea was integrated with its neighbors is the most 
likely outcome of the policy of seclusion followed by the Choson dynasty from mid 
seventeenth century until late into the nineteenth century. “Early Globalization”, then, 
turns out to be a form of Western exceptionalism. In other words, expanding the 
argument proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2005), the institutional framework established 
in Early Modern Europe permitted, if unevenly, a widespread diffusion of the positive 
effects of trade on economic growth. To a lesser extent and later, this is also the case of 
countries with more absolutist regimes than those of Great Britain, the Netherlands and 
the US, such as Spain, Italy, France, etc. 
2) However, in neither China nor Japan were domestic markets disintegrated. At 
some point during the period under consideration, many markets (e.g., the Yangtze river 
delta or western prefectures of Honshu) were roughly as integrated as many advanced 
European regions (e.g. Southern England). Our findings, then, confirm previous 
research by Shiue and Keller (2007) and Bassino (2007). However, we also find that: a) 
in China, market integration decreases from the 1840s on; b) a similar trend (albeit less 
intense) is observed in Japan form the 1830 to the early 1860s. These long-term 
dynamics are opposed to the one followed by most national markets in Western 
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countries before the late nineteenth-century “protectionist backlash” (Federico and 
Persson, 2010). 
3) The state played a central role in the functioning of grain markets in China. 
Besides regulating foreign trade, it mobilized a significant amount of the grain supply 
through the tribute in kind levied on some provinces, accumulated significant stocks to 
be distributed through the vast network of “evernormal granaries”, occasionally sold at 
below-market prices or gave tax relief to some provinces, etc. In Japan, apart from 
restricting foreign trade and controlling the means of transportation that could be used 
for shipments, the state performed a lesser role in grain circulation. On the contrary, 
daimyos and big merchants in Osaka were the main agents operating in a sophisticated 
market that was ultimately based upon the collection of feudal rents in kind and its 
distribution for sales across the country. With all due qualifications, markets forces 
were generally more important in the West as a whole throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Thus, domestic market integration may be achieved through 
different combinations of agents and policies. In turn, each of these combinations has 
specific effects on economic growth.  
4) We identify some important differences between West and East regarding market 
integration: geo-economic scope (intra-continental and inter-continental versus 
national); evolution over time (secular progress versus reversal in the nineteenth 
century); and agents and policies (market forces versus state and others as leading 
forces) and policies (relative openness to foreign trade versus relative closeness). As a 
result, East and West were dissimilar in terms of market integration before and after the 
Industrial Revolution. 
5) That dissimilarity had implications for the appearance of modern economic 
growth. In our interpretation, the above-mentioned differences support the notion that 
the level of intra- and intercontinental of market integration encapsulated by the term 
“early globalization”: a) preceded rather than succeeded the Industrial Revolution in the 
West; b) contributed to, albeit did not cause, the “Great Divergence” between East and 
West. “Early Globalization” soon started to deliver direct and indirect economic 
benefits that were not shared by the East. A higher integration of grain markets between 
China, Korea and Japan in the eighteenth century would have been not only mutually 
beneficial, but also technically and economically possible. It did not happen because of 
political reasons. By closing their economies in the Early Modern Era, the East 
governments might have committed one of the biggest economic policy mistakes ever 
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made, being the lost “early globalization” just part –and probably not the most 
important part- of the total cost in terms of economic growth. 
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Figure 1: Market Integration in the West (London as the numéraire), 
1737-1896. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Note: The series are the (log) relative price residual standard deviation calculated using rolling windows 
span of 35t = . London average is the mean of the other series (the residual standard deviation of the 
(log) relative price of A/L, H/L, M/L, S/L, G/L, V/L, P/L) at each period t.   
Source: See Appendix 1. 
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Figure 2: Market Integration in the West (Pennsylvania) as the 
numéraire), 1754-1896.  
 
 
 
Note: The series are the (log) relative price residual standard deviation calculated using rolling windows 
span of 35t = . London average is the mean of the other series (the residual standard deviation of the 
(log) relative price of A/P, H/P, M/P, S/P, G/P, V/P, L/P) at each period t.   
Source: See Appendix 1. 
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Figure 3: Market integration in England, 1734-1816. 
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Figure 4: Integration of selected rice markets in China, 1778-1910. 
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Figure 5: Rice market integration in Japan, 1744-1863. 
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Figure 6:  Grain market integration in East and West, 1734-1910. 
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Table 1. Methodological scheme   
Step Hypothesis 
Interpretation of 
the hypothesis 
Econometric 
tools 
Results 
1 I(1) nominal prices 1 
Some shifts in supply or demand imply that price adjustments are necessary to clear the market in the long run 
ARMA models, nonstationarity and noninvertibility tests1  
Rejects: None Accepts: All the Japanese, Chinese, European and American series.  
2 I(0) relative prices 1 
Nominal prices are cointegrated (with cointegrating parameter equal to -1). If so, they follow the Law of One Price (weak form) 
ARMA models, nonstationarity and noninvertibility tests1 
Rejects: Between Chinese and Japanese rice series. Accepts: Between all the wheat series (Europe and America). Between all Chinese rice series. Between all Japanese rice series.  
3 
Decreasing dispersion of  relative prices’ unpredicted shocks 2 
Synchronization of the nominal prices. Market integration through the reduction of arbitrage possibilities during the nineteenth Century. 
Graphical tools2 Rejects: In China and Japan. Accepts: In Europe and Pennsylvania.  
 
Notes: 1The I(1) and I(0) properties of the time series are tested with the nonstationarity Shin and Fuller 
(1981) test and confirmed with the noninvertibility Davis et al. (1995) test. 2Decreasing dispersion is tested 
using graphical tools. 3The markets are defined in the section 2. 
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Appendix 1: Sources of data on grain prices. 
Markets in the East: 
Yangtze Delta, 1638-1935: Wang, Y.  (1992), “Secular Trends of Rice Prices in the 
Yangzi Delta, 1638–1935”, Thomas G. Rawski and Lillian M. Li (eds.), Chinese 
History in Economic Perspective, University of California Press, Berkeley, etc., pp. 35-
68. Original prices in taels (37.3 grams of silver) of silver per shi (103.5 liters) 
converted into grams of silver per liter.  
Jiangsu and Hunan, 1736-1911: Qing-era Grain Price Database, Institute of Modern 
History. Academia Sinica:  
(http://www.mh.sinica.edu.tw/PGDigitalDB_Detail.aspx?htmContentID=29&lang=enU
S) Original prices in taels (37.3 grams of silver) of silver per shi (103.5 liters) converted 
into grams of silver per liter. These data were kindly facilitated by Cong Liu whose 
generous help we acknowledge. 
Aizu, Banshu (rural), Bocho, Dewa, Osaka, Edo, Fukuchiyama, Hiroshima, 
Kumamoto, Nagoya and Shinshu, 1710-1863: Original prices in ryos (60 monmes) or 
monmes (3.75 grams of silver) per koku (180.391 liters) converted into grams of silver 
per liter.  Source is http://www.iisg.nl/hpw/data.php#japan, accessible through the web 
page of the International Institute of Social History. We appreciate its generosity for 
making available these data to the international academic community 
 
Markets in the West:  
See Dobado et al. 2102. 
 
 
 
  
 
